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ABSTRACT

This thesis addresses

the problem of the essence and mode of existence

of the objects created by sentences found in literary works. In other
words, it addresses

the question, "Are there such things as fictional

objects, and if so what kind of being do they possess?" It investigates
whether the meanings of the words and sentences
fictional objects, and these objects themselves,

used to produce

are real, ideal, purely

psychic or have another distinct mode of existence; and if the latter, it
shows that these meanings or their objects have more objectivity than
purely imagined objects. It addresses

the question of what consequences

there are in holding various positions on the ontology of word and
sentence meanings that are used in the creation of fictional objects. It
also analyzes the type of logical structure

and nature fictional objects

possess, making use of insights gained from Roman Ingarden.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Topic -

Fictional

and Imaginary Objects

This thesis will address
objects.

the problem of the ontology of fictional

In other words, it will address

the question,

"Are there such

things as fictional objects, and if so what kind of being do they
possess?"
Fictional

objects are those types of objects that have been

created or conceived for use in works novels, plays , poems or epics.
variety of non-personal
Odysseus'

ship.

written or spoken -

They include persons

such as

as well as a

objects ranging from Hamlet's

They do not include those chimerical

dagger to
creations

remain limited to our own personal

imagining or dreaming

called imaginary

of course they become used

specifically

objects -

unless,

for some literary, aesthetic,

fictional objects originated

as imaginary

or informational

-

which

to be

purpose.

All

objects but not all imaginary

objects become fictional objects.

The Common

Understanding

of Fictional

Objects

In everyday life we talk about fictional characters

(which are a

specific type of fictional objects) as if they existed in the way our
friends and neighbors

do. People in lunch rooms can often be

overheard

the sex lives of characters

discussing

opera, and students

of literature

that someone like Raskalnikov
times even comment

in their favorite soap

often debate the psychological
is going through.

on the morality of characters

We also ask each other questions

1

turmoil

Public figures at
in various

about such characters.

sitcoms.

Consider,

for example,
person

Hamlet the Prince of Denmark.

is he?

dislikes?

We can ask:

With whom does he live? What are his likes and

How does he live his life? Is he concerned

himself morally?
reading

All these questions

with improving

can be answered

by either

the play about him or talking to someone who has read it.

Then one could know the answers
of these

or at least determine

the relevance

questions.1

We have an idea as to what type of an individual
reading the play about him.

ts that

What type of

Hamlet is from

Still our common understanding

of Hamlet

he is just a fictional figure who does not really exist.

be seen if someone
lives in Denmark,

started

to ask questions

such as, "You say Hamlet

yet why can't I find his name in this book on the

History of Denmark?"

And we would reply that Hamlet is a literary
as found in his play called Hamlet.

figure created by Shakespeare
Hamlet the Prince of Denmark
someone

This can

who has existed,

as created

by Shakespeare

is not

is existing or will ever exist.

Things We Take for Granted
It seems, however, that there are things we never question
our everyday conversations
academic

about fictional characters

halls to lunch rooms.

1 There appear

to be certain questions

contexts.

For example:

as heard from

We never really ask or think about

that do not make sense when

one talks about fictional objects i.e., future
different

in

occurring

events in

"Are you going to meet Hamlet?"

or

"Have you met him?" when one means precisely the fictional character.
2

questions

such as, "What type of being do fictional characters

have?"

We just seem to have some foggy notion that, "No, Hamlet doesn't
exist and yet I do think about him -

I've even wondered

have acted if placed in his situation.
doesn't

how I would

" But how can we say that he

exist and yet that we have thought

about him?

It seems that

fictional objects like Hamlet must exist in some way, since we do talk
and think about them.

To Be or Not To Be

Let us ask the question

then:

Do fictional objects exist in some

way and if so what type of being do they have exactly?

We say that

Hamlet is a fictional object; but is this to say that he exists or that he
does not exist?

Do fictional objects have no being whatsoever?

Or do

they exist in our minds as some memory or idea that we call into being
when we think of them?
does appear
something

What are we actually talking about here?

that we can initially make a distinction

between

that is real such as this paper you are now reading and a

mirage which is something
type of existence

that is not real and yet does have some

or mode of being.

But is a fictional object something

just like a mirage or fantasy or dream?
negative,

It

The answer

seems to be

for there seem to be some things one is able to do with

fictional objects, but not with dreams.
one's novel with a friend, thereby
same type of emotions

One can, for instance,

possibly causing

one has experienced

3

him/her

oneself, whereas

share
to feel the
one

cannot just give people some drug, for example,
experience

Fictional

the same dream that one had last night.

Objects Cannot Be Identified

Words or Sentences

Used To Describe

A brief reflection upon the nature
obvious that he is not the collection
describe

him because

2

with the Collection

of

Them
of Hamlet also makes it

of words and sentences

used to

when we argue about Hamlet, we do not talk

about those words or sentences
character,

so that they can

as described

-

we talk about Hamlet,

by those words and sentences.

he were just the collection

of words and sentences

the fictional

Furthermore,

if

used to describe

him then it would seem that there would have to be as many Hamlets
as there are languages

that could be used to speak about him.

more, if Hamlet were the collection of sentences
other absurdity

describing

Even

him, an

would follow: One would be faced with the situation

of

there being as many Hamlets as there are books that had collections
words and sentences

used to describe

him (not even mentioning

problems

that would arise with the existence

markings

found in tapes and compact disks) .

2

of

all the

of the magnetized

I can of course tell someone about my dream and so the objects of my

dream cease to be merely imaginary
objects. This is because

the contents

story about my dream. Imaginary

objects and become fictional
of my dream were used to tell a

objects originating

in dreams

pure fancy also become fictional objects when I tell someone
them even if only for purely informational
4

reasons.

or from
about

Three Possible
It appears
problem

Solutions
that there can be three possible

of whether

fictional objects possess

solutions

to the

some kind of reality, and

if so what type.

They Have No Being
The first is that they have no being whatsoever.
nothing

-

They are

they don't exist in any way. Those who hold this position

so because

of their presupposition

that anything

about or referred to has to be real.
and the later Russell,

do

that can be talked

This is the view of Franz Brentano

for example.

(Only Russell's

version of this

theory shall be considered , though.)

They are Purely Mental Entities
The second view is that fictional objects are purely mental
entities.
objects

They have a type of existence
of consciousness,

entirely dependent

mental

in our minds.

entities

They are mere

whose mode of existence

upon some mind who happens

to think them.

there were no minds, they would not exist at all. Accordingly,
like Hamlet would be an idea or image that I personally
in my consciousness

is
If

someone

have before me

when I think of him or read about him.

I would

give "life" or a type of being to the fictional object by having the idea or
image of him in my mind.

(Juliusz Kleiner and E. Kucharski

5

I believe

could be considered

representatives

view is more a logical consequence

of this view although
derived from maintaining

literary work is identical with the psychic experiences
reader.)

On this view, the "mode of existence"

would be the same as that of merely imaginary
personal

actually
that a

of an author

of fictional objects
objects (objects of my

Entities

The third view is that fictional objects are extra-mental
Naturally,

they transcend3

both the written text describing
people who happen
subscribing

entities.

they depend on the mind in some ways, but do not exist in

the mind; rather,

it. They are objects that go beyond
them as well as the minds of those

to read and think about them.

to this position hold it because

Philosophers

of various problems

from the view that fictional objects are just mental

Roman Ingarden

still mind-dependent
discussed

entities.

holds this third view.

3 By the term "transcend"

further

or

and solitary imagining or dreaming).

They are Extra-Mental

resulting

this

is meant something

that is extra-mental

as opposed to mind independent.
below.
6

This will be

but

II. THE FIRST POSSIBLE SOLUTION CONSIDERED:

Let us now consider
whether
have.

the first possible

solution

to the problem

of

fictional objects have being, and if so what kind of being they
According

to it, the answer to this question

is that fictional

objects have no being at all. This position is held, for example,
later Russell,
committed

because

he seems to think that otherwise,

to the uncomfortable

objects that do not exist.
when considering

he would be

position of asserting the existence of

Russell was confronted

sentences

by the

with this problem

such as, "Square circles are heavy."

Whoever says this seems to refer to an object that is both heavy and a
square

circle.

discussed

If one further

here that wherever

must exist, but that square
have the apparent

existence

A "Prelude": Problems

assumes

with the philosophers

there is reference,

to be

what is referred

to

circles obviously do not exist, we would
of a non-existing

object.

with Reference

Those who hold the position that non-real
any being are led to this view because

objects do not have

of problems

they see connected

with the assumption

that reference to fictional objects (or any variety of

imaginary

or contradictory

them.

or absurd

Therefore,

it is that refers.

objects) occurs when talking about

we need to explain briefly what reference

This must be done before going into a further

of the first answer to this problem as put forth by Brentano
developed

is and what

by Russell.

7

analysis

and further

What Is Reference?
It has commonly been held by a number
with Plato and all the way up to Brentano,
and Searle that whenever

language

of philosophers

starting

Russell, Quine, Strawson,

refers to something,

that thing

exists .

How is it possible to make a true statement
existent

object? For if a statement

is to be about

something

that thing must exist, otherwise

statement

mention

mention

nothing;

about a non-

how could the

it, or refer to it? One cannot refer to, or
and if a statement

cannot be about

nothing it must always be about something.

4

We take the word "referring" here to mean that mental act people
perform whenever
meanings
through

expressed
declarative

they connect language,
through
sentences,

specifically by the use of

words and propositions
with objects and states

expressed
of affairs in the

world.
As to the question

of what actually does the "referring," it is the

meanings of words and sentences

used by people to talk about objects

or states of affairs.

For example, the word "dog" has a meaning

refers to an object.

It is the meaning

4

that

of the word that refers to the

Leonard Linsky, Referring (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul,

1967), 122.

8

object; the word merely expresses
declarative

sentence

proposition

(i.e. the meaning

the meaning.

Similarly, with a

such as, "It is raining outside,"
of the declarative

it is the

sentence)

that refers; in

this case a state of affairs is referred to.

Is There Reference
Russell's

to Fictional

Objects?

Answer: No

As mentioned,

Russell states,

in answer to the question

of what

type of being fictional objects have, that they have no being
whatsoever.

They appear to be objects but in fact do not exist in any

way, and when their supposed

"existence" is seen correctly one can

show that they are really nothing at all. 5 His theory of descriptions
also called "paraphrase
that statements

paraphrase

theory" because,

as we will see, Russell claims

about fictional objects are to be replaced

revealing the falsity of the original statements

that Russell thinks
there is reference

reference

to be always to something

by a
-

shows

not exist one would be placed in the paradoxical

to something

to.

that does

position of saying that

an object does not exist while at the same time asserting
of that object:

If

that is real.

then of course there must be an object referred

If, however, one held that there was reference

existence

-

the

This would mean that one would be talking

nonsense.

s The early Russell did believe that non-existent

objects had to have

some type of being as this allowed one to deny they had existence.
Linsky, Referring, 2.
9

See

In response,

Russell argues:

reference

to something

ascription

of attributes

When presented

with an apparent

that one knows does not exist, and an
to it, such as in, "The present

King of France is

bald," one only seems to be referring to a non-existent
however, one is not.
statement

object to be mistaken.

of France and he is bald."
actual current

and that this

that one is referring to a nonFor the "King-of-France-example,"

"There is one and only one present

This paraphrase

King of France.

that the original

by a paraphrase

shows the impression

Russell gives as a paraphrase,

present

Russell asserts

needs to be replaced

paraphrase
existent

Rather,

asserts

the existence

proposition

Thus, the paraphrase

is, according

is false.

6

now see that in the original proposition,

because

of the original

there is nothing

would refer to (which makes the proposition

really have when there is an apparent

there is no reference

reference

the

false), we can

object either; all there is is just a false proposition.

object is just a false assertion

of an

Since this new

to Russell, merely a paraphrase

one, and since in the case of this new proposition,
proposition

King

It is clearly the case that there is no

King of France and so he cannot have any attributes

he does not exist.

existent

object; in truth,

to a nonWhat we

to a non-existent

claiming that an object like the present

King of France does in fact exist, and that he has certain properties.

6

Dr. Mark Roberts pointed out to me the fact that in this paraphrase

there are actually

two propositions.

and only one present

King of France."

this that it is more accurate
false proposition

I assume

he means:

and "He is bald."

"There is one
I gather

to say the original proposition

within it.

10

from

contains

a

According

to Russell,

problematic

then, all one needs to do is to analyze those

propositions

his technique

carefully, express their true meaning

of paraphrase,

through

and then discover that they are simply

false.

Crittenden's

Criticism

Charles Crittenden,

of Russell
in his work UNREALITY: The Metaphysics

Fictional Objects, analyzes Russell's
mode of existence
may be adequate
examples

solution to the problem of the

of fictional objects.

discussion,

not criticize Russell's

example, just its application

holds that when one is presented

statement

about a character

according

to Crittenden,

used as

with a sentence

a more correct interpretation

theory, one would restate

such as,

this as a true

in the epic poem the Odyssey.

would have it preceded by the operator,

does

to literary figures.

And so,

of the
"In the Odyssey

the chief cyclops lives in a cave." Using the paraphrasing
Russell's

when it

In other words, Crittenden

"The chief cyclops lives in a cave," one understands

proposition

that this solution

but that it is inadequate

is used to deal with literary creations.

Crittenden

He maintains

when one is dealing with propositions

in philosophical

of

it as, "In the Odyssey

technique

of

there is one

and only one chief cyclops and he lives in a cave." It is obvious that
the proposition,

"there is one and only one chief cyclop~ and he lives in

a cave," is false, because

it asserts

the existence

of the cyclops.

While

Russell would agree with this, he would, however, have to hold that
the following statement

is true:

"In the Odyssey

there is the false

claim that there actually exists a chief cyclops, and that he lives in a

11

cave."

But as Crittenden

points out, this is not the understanding

normally

have when reading a literary work.

Russell's

theory we would have to be reading it as false history or bad

journalism.

Further,

Under the dictates

we
of

we would not be able to enjoy our participation

in

the story if we viewed it in this way and so no one who has an
understanding

of literature

Thus, according
paraphrase
encounter

it in this way. 7

does read or understand

to Crittenden,

away expressions

all theories

which attempt

which make reference

to

to fictional objects

one of two problems:

either there is a conflict between the truth values of the
initial sentences
paraphrases

are about something

initial sentences

7

and their claimed paraphrases,

Charles Crittenden,

or the

other than what the

are about.8

UNREALITY The Metaphysics of Fictional Objects

(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University

Press, 1991), 23-26.

8 Ibid., 30. Applying Crittenden's
cave," and the paraphrase:

view to "The chief cyclops lives in a

"There is one and only one chief cyclops and

he lives in a cave." the first proposition

would be true according

Crittenden

false. Thus we show a conflict

and the second proposition

of truth values. The second problem also appears
the paraphrase
proposition
character
something

is about something

within a literary work whereas
this character

reality.

12

as

other than what the first

is about. The first proposition

about whether

in the example

to

says something

about a

the second proposition
exists in actual

says

or empirical

With this, Crittenden

has shown that Russell

theory of descriptions

is applied

Crittenden's

Solution:

to literary

is incorrect

when his

creations.

There Is Reference

to Fictional

Objects,

but Still, They Are Nothing
Concerning

Crittenden's

there are such things

own solution

as fictional objects,

to the problem

he claims to show that

reference

to fictional objects does in fact occur.

he makes

an important

we consider

distinction.

the statement,

the other hand
fictional

detective,"

Doyle."

The first example

novel about

Holmes smokes

like, "Sherlock

and "Sherlock

Sherlock

Holmes was created

can be verified by someone

Holmes.

statements

It belongs

"inside" statements,

are statements

giving them properties
rather

in empirical

These examples
reference
cannot

to nonexistent
be paraphrased

who has read a

and designates

the content

The latter two

claims about fictional

objects

by

of a story but

And so their truth value is dependent

to empirical

"outside"

Conan

myth ... " Crittenden

not found within the contents

reality.

their correspondence
of this nature

making

by Arthur

to a class of statements

of the story as what makes them true or false.
examples

a pipe"; and on

Holmes is my favorite

which one can begin with, "in the story/novel/
calls such

In order to show this,

It can be seen if on the one hand,

"Sherlock

statements

of whether

reality.

Crittenden

upon

calls statements

statements.
of "outside"

statements

clearly show that

objects does in fact take place.
away as being just false statements

13

For they
affirming

the existence

of objects which in fact do not exist.

could convince us that, "The present
false statement,

king of France is bald," is just a

whoever says with conviction,

"Sherlock

favorite fictional detective," would be dumbfounded
try to make him believe that his assertion
confronted

with a true statement.

as false, clearly, reference

the question

whether

answered:

literary work.
statements"

he calls "inside" statements

introduces

of "inside

even contradictory.

For what
ones for

out of a story and

"in the story" (or with similar phrases),

a so-called inside statement
occurring

occurs within a

would really have to be outside

it with the phrase,

the sentences

at least, we

to fictional objects.

First, as soon as one pulls a sentence

one has turned

rather,

statements

of the referring function
-

Thus,

to fictional objects has been

cases of reference

seems, however, unclear

in this

the original

does in fact occur here.

also believes that reference

His analysis

two reasons:

Clearly, we are

away by unmasking

In the case of the so-called outside

However, Crittenden

if someone would

was false.

there is reference

are dealing also with genuine

Holmes is my

Thus, since it is impossible

case to explain the reference function
statement

Even if Russell

into an outside

one, as

in the story do not begin with this phrase;

it is always someone outside of the story who makes the

determination
statement

of whether

or not some "object" of a so-called

has the properties

ascribed

to it by comparing

to the text which exists in the real world.

outside

affairs objectively separated

the statement

Second, one can have truth

or falsity only when there is some type of correspondence
belief and something

inside

between

a

of the belief itself, that is, a state of
from the belief.

seems to hold, for inside statements

14

Crittenden,

at least, a coherence

however,
theory of

truth as opposed to any type of correspondence
gleaned

from his statement:

"Storytellers'

make claims about independently
construct

9

[statements]

Yet Crittenden

conditions
operator

of assertions

are not used to

existing states of affairs but to

novel have no truth value and themselves

novel".

sentences

a fictional situation ... [S]entences

truth-values

theory as can be

appearing

in the text of a

serve as criteria for the

about the contents

holds that inside statements

of the

have truth

but that this only occurs when one places the phrase
"in the story'' in front of the statement.

or

The point to be made

here is that in examining

an inside statement,

as "In the story, Sherlock

Holmes smokes a pipe," one realizes that

the referent

of the statement

text of the novel itself.

is not Sherlock

to them.

withstanding,

Thus, Crittenden's

claims to the contrary
genuine

fictional objects seems to occur only with outside
Crittenden

to fictional objects

when they have their operator

on the basis of his assumptions,

Even though

such

Holmes but the actual

This shows that reference

is not made with inside statements
attached

with its operator,

not

reference

to

statements.

has shown that genuine

reference

to

fictional objects does in fact occur, for him, this does not entail,
however, that these objects have being of any type which is beyond
that of a purely conceptual
grammatical

or grammatical

object (for Crittenden

object is an object of reference,

an object qua referred to).

He holds that fictional objects have their own particular
they belong to their own conceptual
fact that in common discourse

9

Crittenden,

category.
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status,

that

It is just an accepted

we make reference

UNREALITY , 91.

a

to fictional objects

without

giving them the status

Crittenden

status

tangible

"Sherlock

Holmes smokes

true propositions.
Sherlock

This is because

Holmes has.

of the unique

him.

a pipe," and,

the context

sentences

of telling a story.

11

have been created

Crittenden

in existence

by an author

to
in

holds:

having

at all .... There are such objects

solely in the sense that they have been written
thereby

of the

references

Like direct objects, fictions are purely intentional,
no status

conceptual

he is a member

class of fictional objects we can make genuine
This is because

that

He is a fictional object so ipso facto he

does not exist but at the same time because
unique

existence.

Holmes does not exist." 10 Here we have two sentences

"Sherlock
express

uses the examples,

of actual

become available for thought

about and

or reference.12

and:

lO

This is certainly

a problem for how can Sherlock

Holmes not exist

and yet it be true that he is a pipe smoker? The problem as Dr. Mark
Roberts pointed out to me is not that properties
fictional object but that a proposition
attributable

these properties

as

to a fictional object can be true.

11 It is more correct,
sentences

expressing

can be given to a

as we will see in later sections,

and their meanings

Crittenden,

however,

have been created

12 Crittenden,

by an author.

does not make the distinction

and their meanings.
UNREALITY, 65.
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to say that

between

sentences

Intentional
thought

objects are objects of thought,

about; grammatical

reference,

sentence
objects,

objects are objects of

items qua referred

fail to be a grammatical

to. An intentional

one through

includes

object can

there failing to be a

about it. But all mere referents
for reference

items qua

thinking

are intentional
of the intended

referent.13

Some Critical

Comments

on Crittenden

Using his class of outside
Crittenden

discussed

seems to have shown that reference

figures does indeed occur.
reference

statements

earlier,

to fictional literary

What he has not adequately

shown is that

does also occur with what he calls inside statements.

Moreover, even if we were to grant him that he has shown reference
occur in the context

of inside statements

to

; he still holds that fictional

objects are nothing : As will be shown, this position

seems to be

mistaken.
Further,
Crittenden
reader's
reference

when discussing

says that an author

attention

both introduces

a story

an object and calls a

But how can there be reference

the object is first constructed?

13 Ibid., 66. Intentional

in which
to a fictional

It is only after this

objects can be looked on as being imaginary

objects (see my earlier distinction,
fictional

in creating

to it and that this is a double process

is taking place.

object unless

the role of an author

objects.
17

pagel)

and grammatical

objects as

construction

that one can refer to the object . How can a sentence

has the function

to construct

making reference?
written
presented

a fictional world at the same time be

That the sentences

out make reference

that

in a novel as they are being

to some object that is not even yet

seems to be questionable

at best.

fictional world is being constructed,
"How can there be true reference

Moreover, if some

not only does one need to ask,
to it unless

also, "How would one know whether

it is first described,"

the impressions

but

one has had

about the fictional world were correct until the fictional world was fully
presented?

"

Response

to Russell

Where Russell

and Crittenden:

Is Correct

Russell is correct in holding that reference
something

must always be to

that exists; it is , after all, just a logical truth

that if one

were able to talk about a fictional object one would have to have
something

which is present

Where Russell

for that discussion

to take place.

Is Wrong

Russell is wrong however in holding that reference
occur when one is dealing with fictions.
theories

are not adequate

being fictional

objects

responses

possess.
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does not

We have shown that Russell 's

to the problem

of what type of

Where Crittenden
Crittenden

Is Correct

appears

to have successfully

shown that there is

reference

to fictional objects.

reference

to a fictional object takes place when one is presented

proposition

with a

such as, "The cyclopses are the most terrifying creatures

found in Greek literature."
or the seven-headed
statements

I don't see how one can deny that

One may disagree and think that Proteus

Hydra are more terrifying, but the fact that such

are understood

and can be debated

proves that reference

fictional objects has occurred.

Where Crittenden
Crittenden
reference

Is Wrong

is wrong, however, in holding that there can be

to non-being.

The very fact that one has reference

to

"something ," in this case to a fictional object, shows that something
must be present
possible

to assert

nothing.

which is the object of one 's reference . It is not
that there is reference

and then to say that it is to

But this is exactly what Crittenden

seems to do.

The Failure of Non-Being as the First Solution
Therefore,
analyzing

we can now see from all that we have done above in

the ideas of Russell and Crittenden

fictional objects are nothing
them.

at all is false since there is reference

We do have genuine reference

established

that the theory that

to fictional objects and this has

the fact that there are such things as fictional objects.
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to

to

III. THE SECOND POSSIBLE SOLUTION CONSIDERED:
Now that we've seen that fictional objects are not nothing,
consider

the second possible

mental

entities;

mental

entities

entities

solution,

let us

namely that they are purely

that are mere objects of consciousness

whose mode of existence

some mind who happens

-

is entirely dependent

to think them.

upon

In this section I will try to

refute this view that admits that there are fictional objects but reduces
them to purely mind-dependent
distinction,

however, between

and something
subsequently

something

being purely mind-dependent
in its initial creation,

also have some type of extra-mental

existence

"correlates"

One needs to make a

that may be mind-dependent

that I am addressing
mental

entities.

existence.

but

The view

here is that fictional objects have no extra-

whatsoever,

that they are strictly limited to being

of some mind experiencing

them.

This view is held by all those who adhere to psychologism.
Psychologism

is the view that everything

just a mental construct
be established
self-observation.
mathematical
dependent,

we know or think we know is

of one form or another.

only through

purely subjective

One consequence

elements

and logical truths.

equation,

or that the law of non-contradiction,

operative

until Aristotle formulated

But is it really
up the

for example, was not

it? These types of criticisms

to refute psychologism

fictional objects are purely mind-dependent

were

in all of its forms.

One does, however, not need to be a psychologist
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derived from

seen as being mind-

the case that 2+2 did not equal 4 until someone thought

effectively used by Husserl

truth is to

of this view is that, since all

and logical laws are ultimately
so are all mathematical

Accordingly,

to hold that

and have no extra-mental

existence

whatsoever.

Let us now look into the evidence against

this

thesis.

Evidence

Against

this Thesis:;:

There Is Inter-subjective
Although
creation,

Agreement

fictional objects depend upon a mind for their initial

they must transcend

the mind; for when people are heard

discussing

some fictional character,

agreement

about the character,

the mind.

If they were only in the mind, each person would have his or

her own understanding

there can be inter-subjective

proving that fictional objects transcend

which could not be communicated

persons.

But it is an undeniable

therefore,

a fictional object is not purely mind-dependent:

fact that there is communication;

like Hamlet only existed in one's memory or imagination,
there be any real agreement
the mind of another
communicate
starting
character

If someone

how could

among people, since no one can jump into

to experience

that object?

When two people

there is some referent which is used as the common

point of that communication.

In the case of a fictional

referred to by a text (more specifically the many sentences

which build up and define the character)
the character
character

to other

with the actual description

as found in the text.

for the correctness

we can compare our idea of
and attributes

of the

The text becomes the final arbitrator

of our understanding.
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Speaking

about Fictional

Objects Is Not Speaking

about Anyone's

Mind
Another

argument

purely mind-dependent

against

the thesis that fictional objects are

is that when one talks about a fictional object

such as Hamlet one does not talk about one's own mind nor the mind
of the person
the author

one is speaking

with, nor does one talk about the mind of

who originally created him (since after all he may be dead) .

One does not study the mind and its mental actions
to the mind and its mental actions when speaking
does not focus attention
under

discussion,

the mental

or make reference

about Hamlet . One

on any mental act but rather

i.e . specifically

act of reference

on the subject

Hamlet . It is, however,

necessary

to occur when one talks to another

for

about

Hamlet.

Whose Mind Is the Object In?
A third argument
purely mind-dependent
mental

entities

the view that fictional objects are

entities

is that if fictional objects were purely

then for any true statement

fictional character
to in determining

against

made about a particular

one would have to know whose mind one is referring
whether

the statement

not the case , as we can be confronted
about Hamlet without

is true.

And this is clearly

with any number

of propositions

knowing whose mind created them in order to

come to some understanding

about Hamlet.
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Multiplication

of Fictional

There is another
existence

Objects?

absurdity

following from making the mode of

of a fictional object purely mind-dependent

extra-mental even though mind-dependent

as opposed

in the object's origin:

to
There

would have to be as many fictional objects as there are minds who
think about them.
Hamlets

Who really wants to hold that there are as many

as there are minds who have thought

think about him?
understanding

about him or who will

Is it not the case that one can come to an

about who Hamlet is as a fictional character

because

all have the same Hamlet in mind when talking about him or thinking
about him?
Therefore
be purely mental

I think we can safely say that fictional objects cannot
entities.
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we

IV. THE THIRD SOLUTION

As we have shown, fictional objects are neither
they purely mental entities.
outside

of the mind.

they possibly have?

nor are

Therefore they must have some being

But the question

is, just what type of being could

In this section I will show in what way fictional

objects are extra-mental
argumentation

nothing,

entities,

mainly using the analysis

and

of Roman Ingarden.

Ingarden

has shown in his book The Literary Work of Art that in

order to understand

the type of existence

a "represented

object" (i.e.

fictional object in a literary work) has, one must first understand
nature

of the entities

the type of existence

which create the represented
which those entities

first brings us to an understanding

have.

the

object, as well as
Ingarden,

of the type of existence

therefore,
the

meanings

of words have, since they are the basic building blocks of the

meanings

of sentences

of meanings

of sentences

objects in those worlds.
word?"

which in turn allow the build-up

of complexes

which are used to create fictional worlds or
Thus, we need to ask first, "Just what is a

Next, we need to show that words are different from meanings;

subsequently,

an analogous

difference

between

sentences

meanings

needs to be pointed out, and finally, the question

be asked,

"What is the mode of existence
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of meanings?"

and their
needs to

-

The Nature and the Mode of Existence
Considerations

of Words, and

Showing Their Difference

The mode of existence
words can be combined
be real entities

of words and of sentences

seems to be easily accounted

in the real world around

audible

signs can be presented

they themselves

sign.

These

in two different ways, either as an

signs which point to something

But these physical
other than what

are.

And what they point to are meanings.
different from the signs used to represent
fact that one can have many instances

expressed

in various languages

word "love" expressed

That meanings

are

them can be shown by the

of the same word and yet all

those words point to the same meaning.
meaning

for: Both seem to

as a physical

sound or as a visible marking of some kind.

signs are just that:

into which

us.

A word is, after all, to be understood
physical

from Their Meanings

One can also have the same
such as the meaning

of the

as it is in English as well as in Latin:

"amor."

We also have the cases of those words which express

the same

meaning

differently.

in a language yet are spelled and pronounced

These are the synonyms
and "summit."

such as "hit" and "strike" as well as "peak"

Clearly, as we have seen in these examples,

the words

differ from each other, but the meaning is .the same, which shows an
identification

of word and meaning to be mistaken.

A further argument
and their meanings
the same physical

in support

of the difference between words

can be derived from the peculiar
representation

instances

where

of the word is used but different
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•

meanings

are associated

in a sentence.
meaning

with it according

(It is only after a context is given that a particular

is actually expressed

homonyms

to the context that is used

by the word.)

I am thinking

such as "bat" which can have the meaning

of those

of a strong solid

stick made of wood with one end thicker or broader than the other used
in baseball
mammals
meaning

or the meaning

of any variety of creatures

who are the only

capable of true flight. Again, identifying the word and its
would make it impossible

totally different

for the same word to have these

meanings.

There are also such words as "bare" and "bear" which have the
same pronunciation

or word sound and yet have a different spelling and

meaning .
If these words were written (as in the case of the former pair) or
spoken

(as in the case of the latter pair) by themselves

and not in the

context of other words we would never be able to tell what meaning
they have.

Words and Communication
Individual

words are used in order to communicate

not only to others,
communicating

but also as a record for ourselves.

our thoughts,
It seems that in

with others we seldom use only one word.

We usually

communicate

by the use of subject,

An exception

to this seems to be words we use for commands

warnings
inspection

verb, and object type sentences.
or

such as "Stop!" or "Fire! " But even these upon closer
reveal that they are a type of uniquely

as revealed by the fact that an exclamation

imbedded

sentence

point is used to express
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urgency or admonition.
communicating

Also, in order to be of any use in

some idea which would produce an action or change in

action, these unique

"words" need to be directed to some individual

group of individuals,

such as in, "You there, in the blue shirt, Stop! a

car is coming" or "Everyone in the theater -

or

Fire! Get out!", although

only the word "Stop" is spoken in the former example and "Fire" in the
latter example.

We do have the example of a word such as "Hello"

which functions

both as a word and as a sentence.

word to function
even though

as a sentence

it doesn't

it has to be directed to someone and

have an exclamation

we can tell its particular

(In order for this

function

point when written down

by the fact that we capitalize

letter when it is used as a sentence

and we do not capitalize

the first
it when

making reference to it as just being a word of the English language14).
Still, ordinarily,

when we communicate

with others,

to communicate

with them, we use individual

or at least intend

words in combination

with other words (most often explicitly but sometimes

implicitly as in

the above examples).

Sentences

and Meanings

-

Where or How Do Meanings

Exist?

We have seen the difference between words and their meanings;
now we need to show the difference between

sentences

and their

meanings.

14

Roman Ingarden,

(Evanston,

The Literary Work of Art, trans. George G. Grabowicz

Illinois: Northwestern

is quoting A. Marty.
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University

Press, 1973), 108. Ingarden

The difference between sentences
shown through

(synonymous)

in his automobile."

spoken in. For example,
on a baseball

expressing

one can have two

the same meaning,

such

in his car," and, "The man is riding

One can also have two equal sentences

each having a different meaning

spoken

For example,

sentences

as, "The man is driving around
around

can be

similar to those used to show that words

arguments

are different from their meanings.
different

and their meanings

depending

upon the context they are

"Please pick up that bat and give it to me,"

field has a different meaning

from, "Please pick

up that bat and give it to me," spoken in a biological research
laboratory.

Again, since different

meaning,

and the same sentence

mistaken

to identify sentences

Meanings

appear

sentences

can express

can express

different

the same
meanings,

and meanings.

to be able to "transcend"

the words that

express

them, and so they are different from the words and word

sounds

used to express

minds of individuals
consciousness
question

of a particular

As Neither

by lngarden
meanings

sentences

In the

as a whole?

This

but he does have an answer

as

have.

Real nor Ideal

We have seen that the type of existence
have is easily accounted

exist?

society or somehow in the collective

of some society or of humanity

to what type of existence

Meanings

But where do meanings

them.

is not addressed

it is

that words and sentences

for. We have also seen that words and

are different from their meanings.

however, what type of existence
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meanings

We have not yet shown,
have.

meanings

of words and sentences

projected

by them would also have to be ideal since they would rest on

an ideal foundation.

were ideal, the objects created

If meanings

or

are ideal then the idea of someone

like Hamlet or even Donald Duck had to have existed for all time Oust
like the idea of a triangle) since the complex meaning

units used to

create them existed for all time and so they were just waiting to be
discovered

by some literary adventurer.

case at all although

This does not seem to be the

can refer to ideal objects such as the

meanings

concept of a perfect triangle.
If, therefore,

meanings

either real or ideal1

6,

of words and sentences

then what type of existence

do they have?

have shown that they are not purely psychological
only in the minds of those who happen
refer to the mind of the author

brought

these meanings
in which authors
position

entities

existing

to think them, since we do not

acts of consciousness

(mental acts)

to words. But the putting together

to form complexes
participate.

We

or reader when we reflect on the

into being by subjective

which bind various meanings

do not seem to be

of meanings

of

is a truly creative act

However , he also seems to hold the

that one makes use of concepts

being (which are like essences

in bringing meanings

into

in that they are ideal). And one makes

use of many slightly different meanings

which reflect different aspects

of an ideal concept in the creation of a literary work. See last section of
this paper: Ideal Concepts

Needed for Intersubjective

Identity

of

Sentences.
16

I cannot

go into the question

whether

this holds for all meanings.

does, however, seem to hold for all meanings
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used in a literary work.

It

meaning

of a word or sentence.

of the problems
the status

We seem to be stuck, though,

involved with both possibilities

of word and sentence

meanings

because

referred to above; thus,

seems to remain in a sort of

limbo between the poles of being real or ideal.

Meanings

As Intentional

Ingarden's

solution

to this problem is that the meanings

words are purely intentional

in their mode of existence.

object is the referent of our thought.

meaning

expressed

interdependent

An intentional

But objects of thought

either simple or complex, just as meanings

of

can be

can be simple, as in one

by a word, or complex, as in a variety of

meanings

expressed

by sentences

explaining

or

building up a fictional world.
Since words are the basic building blocks used to create
sentences,

and since the objects projected

purely intentional,
meanings

by word-meanings

the objects and state of affairs projected

of sentences

must also be purely intentional

are
by the

in their mode

of existence.
Ingarden

holds that every sentence

intentional

sentence

sentences

are actually

correlate.

Purely intentional

correlates

the states of affairs projected

units of the words that comprise
well as of sentences,

has what he calls a purely

according

the sentences.
to Ingarden,

by the meaning

Meanings

also are initially dependent

mental acts which must produce
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of words as

may be initially dependent

upon certain mental acts for their creation in our minds.
words and sentences

of

Meanings

upon certain

other

the physical word-representations

of

(i.e. the audible or written word); but once this has occurred,
meanings

come to be mind-independent

inter-subjective

these

entities.

This

can readily be seen if one thinks of all the ways we have of
communicating

novels and plays such as our use of printed

matter,

laser disks, audio tapes etc.
The meanings

of words as well the meaning

are what one understands

units of sentences

. A word is tied or bonded to a meaning

mental act . For words are only intelligible if one understands
meanings

that have become associated

of words which have the important

of projecting

they represent.

Most often various meanings

other meanings

to complete the projection

the

It is the meanings

with them.

function

by a

the objects

need to be used with

of an object.

For example

the meaning

of the word "dog" projects an incomplete

the meaning

of the word "black"; but when placed together we have a

more specific projection

of "black dog" although

object , as does

this is still incomplete

as we do not yet know what type of dog is being referred to. However , it
is the objects projected
affairs projected

by individual

by the meaning

upon. The understanding

So meanings

affairs themselves

which one focuses

the meaning

the language

by single words or

of states of affairs as well as the states

projected

by sentences)

present.
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of

in which

are what one uses to understand

(whether they be objects projected

objects as components

subjectively

Anyone can understand

as long as he understands

they are expressed.
those entities

units of sentences

of the meaning and the focusing upon the

object occur simultaneously.
words or sentences

words as well as the states of

that become inter-

of

Every sentence
sentence

correlate,

an intentional
sentence

has, according

and for the declarative

state of affairs projected

expresses.

an intentional

sentence,

by the meaning

or as objectively existing.

true judgments

be called propositions)

(the meanings

have purely intentional

is

the

intentional

sentence

correlates

Only sentences

sentence

to objectively existing states of affairs.
are projected

would

correlates

that

All other purely

by meanings

and have no

to any other objectivity.

Types of Intentional
and Derived

units

of the sentences

correspond

correspondence

this correlate

States of affairs can exist only in two ways:

either as purely intentional
which express

to Ingarden,

Objects: Original Purely Intentional

Purely Intentional

Objects

Objects

(Also Called Fictional

Objects)
Ingarden

distinguishes

between

objects and derived purely intentional
The former are those entities
without

attempting

beings.

These entities

consciousness
thinking

originally purely intentional
objects.

created

(yet) to communicate

being

them to other conscious

are strictly personal

of the individual

by a conscious

who creates

as they reside in the
them.

A character

I am

of for possible use in a parody of a poem I have not written yet

would be an example of this.
Derived purely intentional
entities

which contain

intentionality
indirectly

objects on the other hand are those

a borrowed

intentionality

that resides

in the

of the meaning units used to create them and only

in the original intentionality
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of some conscious

creator.

Derived purely intentional
confines

objects then are freed from the subjective

of any one individual

subjectively

present

to any number

them as being identically
of and submitting

it for publication

and are able to be inter-

of individuals

the same.

of to become inter-subjectively
purely intentional

consciousness

who can then identify

My writing out the poem I thought
would cause the character

present,

thought

that is, to become a derived

object.

Strictly speaking,

a fictional object is a derived purely intentional

object of a specific type.1 7 We can say that a fictional object has more
objectivity than things that are just purely imagined.

Things or people

or places that we did imagine only exist as a referent

of our past

thoughts
physical

in our memories;

unless

we express

those ideas in some

form, e.g. write them out, what type of existence

said to have?
inter-subjective

can they be

They cannot be shared with others and so there is no
reality which people can refer to and analyze.

other hand, I'm sure we have all had the experience
novel and strongly disagreeing

of reading

some

with the actor chosen for a stage play

about it or with the way the novel was presented
friends might have thought

On the

in a movie.

that the representation

and one can argue with them because

Some

was done correctly

of the objectively existing novel

to which one can make reference.

17 One could have any variety of derived purely

based on the type of object that is projected

intentional

by the meaning

objects
units used

to create them. For example one could write about mathematical
objects,

contradictory

objects,

historical
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objects etc.

Derived

Purely Intentional

Ingarden
object:

distinguishes

A. its content,

existence.

Objects
three aspects

B. its intentional

of a purely intentional

structure

and C. its mode of

Since we are dealing with derived purely intentional

objects

(i.e. fictional objects) in this paper we will narrow the explanation
his analysis

to derived purely intentional

purely intentional
understanding

more understandable

"a bear."

formal aspects
qualifying

objects).

in explaining

derived purely intentional
expression:

to come to a better

To help make these concepts

them let us take as an example

object projected

To the content

by the meaning

the object as a bear while partaking

as being analogous

of the formal aspects

of

i.e. 1 and 2, can be looked upon

to the common distinction

of an object being

of form and matter) and, 3) an existence

for the bear such as ideal, real, absurd,

of some sort.

(This

was

or fictitious,

story within a story, as when a fictional character

i.e. a

in a novel mentions

a bear as the subject of a fairy tale he had written.)
derived purely intentional

1) the

attributes

last category would only depend upon what type of existence
intended

the

of the

(A) of this object belongs:

of the bear, 2) the total range of material

the bear (these latter two categories,

comprised

objects (except when original

objects need to be considered

of intentional

of

The content

object has its own formal aspect

of a

as we have

just shown but the main element of this formal aspect is that it
functions

as the carrier of the properties

the type of object in question.

or features

The intentional

object also has its own formal aspect or structure

35

that determine

object as an intentional
(B) or, as Ingarden

also calls it, its own "carrier" of its properties.
the fact that it has a content

To this carrier belongs

(the bear in question,

remember

has its own form, matter and existence

ultimately

an intended

existence)).

which as we
(even if it is only

But what also belongs to this

carrier is the fact that the intentional

object is only "something

intended."

This latter fact shows the mode of existence

intentional

objects possess

is one of a purely heteronomous

no matter what the portrayed
or fictitious

existence

bear in question).18

a mode of existence

(Heteronomous

consequences

for understanding

the purely intentional

'nothing'

in terms of ontic autonomy

by subjective

conscious

ontically autonomous

18

Ingarden,

20

... in itself it can neither

object it is an 'illusion'

The Literary Work, 118-120.

Ibid., 122.
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or writing

object as such is, itself, a

He says also, "In comparison

19 Ibid., 122 and 132.

upon

is intentional.

itself. "20 This is precisely because
acts.

of

The intentional

(my thinking

object precisely

tells us, "The purely intentional

of changing

the nature

those acts and is different from

Ingarden

be capable

objects

object is dependent

for its creation

about a specific "bear"), but transcends
them because

"double-carrier"

(This aspect of intentional

of any derived purely intentional

original acts of consciousness

may be (the real

or "merely intended." 19)

fictional objects as will be seen later in this thesis.)
structure

existence

in the sense of having

objects have a peculiar

aspect about them.

will have important

of its content

that is "merely assigned"

And so we see that intentional
or "two-sided"

(C) that all

exist nor

it is created
with any

... that draws its illusory

existence

and essence

from the projecting

'meaning-bestowal'

... ) of the intentional

meaning-bestowal

act for Ingarden

intention

act."21

I understand

a

to be one in which either meaning

is originally bonded to some word or meanings
combination

(from the

of many different interrelated

are built up through

sentences.

the

With this latter

case, one would have meaning units which project a complex object
such as the portrayal
various
situations

personality

for example, of a particular

traits coming to light from being in different

etc. as opposed

object occurring

bear with its own

to the projection

of just a simple single

from the bonding of a meaning to a word as in the

former instance.

Derived

Purely Intentional

According to Ingarden

Sentence

Correlates

"every sentence

'has' according

essence,

a derived purely intentional

sentence

includes

even absurd

sentences.

distinguished
content,

and ambiguous

three aspects

B. its intentional

correlate."22

example the sentence
brown."

In the content

their matter,

sentence

more understandable

correlates,

2) their formal structure

22 Ibid., 130.
37

so

correlates.

let us take as an

"Is the bear brown?" and "The bear is

(A) of these correlates

21 Ibid., 123.

object, A. its

and C. its mode of existence,

too do we need to do the same with intentional
To help make these concepts

This also

Just as we

of a purely intentional
structure

to its own

we can distinguish:

and, 3) an existence

of some

1)

sort.

The matter

in these two examples

are exactly the same if we

hold that the same bear is being referred to in each example;
their structures
question.

are different according

to the types of correlates

The former example has the structure

whereas

the latter example has a structure

affairs."

The ontic characterization

examples

in

of that of a "problem"

of that of a "state of

or type of existence

for our

is that of "existing" for the state of affairs but only having

the status
examples

of being "questionable"

for that of the problem . The ·se

of course would need to be placed within a context of some

sort so that one knew whether
bear was intended.
structure

Ingarden

from the structure

themselves

existence

intentional

distinguishes

the aforementioned

(B) of intentional

are that of having a content

real, ideal, fictitious
intended

an ideal bear, a real bear, or a fictitious

sentence

which have their own "carrier" of properties

The features

peculiar

however,

aspect about them.

and features.

of some intended

sort i.e.

etc. and the feature of only having a (C) merely
(ontically heteronomous).

sentence

"two-sided,"

correlates

correlates

Uust as intentional

"double-carrier"
23

This shows that

The importance

objects) have a

or "double property-structure''
of this aspect for understanding

fictional objects will come to light in the following sections

Necessity

of Intentional

Objects

It seems obvious that if the meanings
have a purely intentional

23

mode of existence

Ibid., 130-132 .
38

of words and sentences
then there are many

objects or entities

that are purely intentional.

according

to Ingarden,

correlate";

we can infer from this that any object that any speaker

author

every sentence

As was mentioned,

"has its own purely intentional

would focus upon, be it a person,

etc., has a purely intentional
within fiction, of course,
of fiction.

a state of affairs, an event

existence . This holds for everything

but also in some sense for all things outside

Things do really exist and have their own reality and

autonomous

mind-independent

(not at all depending

upon a mind)

existence.

But a real object I write or think about also has an

intentional

existence,

that is, it is an intentional

because

I am writing or thinking

another

object and its intentionality

real object.

about it. Usually we are not aware of

object is , as Ingarden

aware of the intentional
about some judgment
real person,

when writing or thinking

We only become
or unsure

state of affairs, event, etc.

between

out, purely intentional

sentence

So are purely intentional

objects.

their content

mode of existence . Ingarden

and their intentional

mutually
correlate

contradictory
as such -

We made

structure

and

points out, "If one were not to do this,

one would have to concede that purely intentional

sentence

about a

we are making about a real object or supposed

are "two-sided."

a distinction

says, "transparent."

objects when we may be mistaken

As was earlier pointed

contain

object precisely

Normally, we focus upon the real object, and its

intentional

correlates

or

sentence

correlates

elements ... the purely intentional
precisely

because

always has one and the same heteronomous

24 Ibid., 131.

39

it is intentional

-

mode of existence."24

The content,

as was pointed out earlier, can have ontic characteristics

different from that of the purely intentional
the purely intentional
sentence

correlate

of heteronomous
mentions

sentence

"carrier" of that content.

correlate

which is

The purely intentional

as carrier can only have one mode of existence,
existence.

An example of the contradiction

that would occur if his distinction

"carrier" and content

that

Ingarden

between intentional

of that carrier was not made is: It would appear

that one was saying that an object could be both real (as in being
created

and not previously

has just an intentional

Ontically

contents

mode of existence.

Autonomous

lngarden

existing in space and time) and yet that it

vs. Purely Intentional

further points out that the criteria applying to the

of purely intentional

states of affairs are different from those

which apply to ontically autonomous

states of affairs.

For example:

the latter must satisfy all laws that would arise from the nature

1)

of the

objects that may make up such a state of affairs; i.e. all physical,
chemical

and similar laws must be obeyed; 2) they cannot contain

mutually

exclusive material

unequivocally,

elements;

3) they must be "completely,

detennined." 2 5 All three of these points can be violated

by purely intentional

states of affairs.

But before showing that this is

in fact the case we need to analyze the ideas of Barry Smith.
states,

25

"Ingarden

Smith

was the first to point out fictional objects possess

Ibid., 142.
40

a

quite peculiar

double property-structure. "26 What Smith is referring to

here is the "double-carrier"
intentional

sentence

".. .Ingarden's

or "two-sided"

correlates

suggestion

structure

aspect of purely

as found in works of literary

fiction.

is that we must develop a conception

fictional objects as radically distinct,
real objects of the material
Smith uses examples

world.

in their property

of

behavior,

from

"2 7

that bring out and extend what Ingarden

talks about theoretically.

Smith does not, however, fall into the same

problems

had with his inside/ outside

that Crittenden

Basing his ideas on Ingarden,

distinction.

Smith tells us that fictional objects are

to be conceived as having two different types of properties:
properties

one rank of

in the strict sense, the other more properly understood

having ascribed characteristics.28

as

[I take Smith to mean either ascribed

explicitly by the text or derived by the reader from what is implicitly
given in the text.] Smith says that two different types of statements
can be made about fictional characters
aforementioned

two ranks.

These statements

a different kind of "truth-behavior."
he calls A-statements.

and theoretical

texts.

to the

each have what he calls

The first type correspond

These include

about fictional characters

which correspond

meta-level

statements

made

of the type which "are to be found in critical

(Examples

would be:

'Sherlock

Holmes was

26 Barry Smith, "Ingarden vs. Meinong on the logic of Fiction,"
Philosophy and Phenomenological

Research,

27 Ibid., 101.
28Jbid.,

to what

101.
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100.

presented

in novel N as a violin-playing

statements

can be unconditionally

satisfy the law of excluded
he calls B-statements.
themselves,

The second type correspond

but they may also include

scientific

laws."30

be able to acknowledge

limits ... deduce

by appealing

as correct or incorrect

the predicates)

the fictional

those statements

The first type of B-statements

would be determined

to what

They are found within the works of fiction

"... within certain

narrow

true or false and they will always

middle.

ourselves

interpret

detective' ... )."29 These A-

such as, "Sherlock

"Sherlock

to logical and

(which we would only
if we metaphorically

Holmes was a detective,"

correct by simply appealing

character

we can

to the text although

Holmes" was not a detective

in the

sense of the term since only real people may be detectives.

Smith

states

excluded
statements
handed"
statement

that B-statements

unlike A-statements

middle. To explain what Smith proposes
of the second

type violating

correct

nor incorrect

"Hamlet was left-

One discovers
although

"It is not the case that Hamlet was left-handed"
that Hamlet was not left-handed,"

let us analyze two B-

a logical law:

and "Hamlet was not left-handed."
to be neither

fail the law of

each

their negations,

and "It is not the case

are also neither

correct

nor

incorrect.
Smith told us that there are other B-statements
type) which one can deduce

from the B-statements

found within the novels themselves
scientific

29

laws.

by appealing

He does not give us an example

Ibid., 100.

30 Ibid., 100.
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(the second
(the first type)

to logical and
of a scientific

type but

I assume

he must

Holmes cannot
as Sherlock
detective

mean something

walk through

detectives

walls" as a correct

Holmes is presented

living in London.

like "The detective

Sherlock

statement

as being a nineteenth

of this kind

Century

And I don't know of any nineteenth

Century

who had such an ability to break the laws of nature

currently

know them.

given Sherlock
changed

Now Sir Arthur

supernatural

Conan Doyle could have easily

Holmes such a characteristic

the type of realistic
or science

detective

but that would have

stories

fiction detective

he had written

to

stories.

As we have seen there are two types of B-statements,
found within

as we

the novel and those formulated

i.e., those

after the existence

of the

former.
We, however,

can be more precise concerning

proposes

as one can actually

different

categories

come up with varieties

of the second

the law of excluded

what Smith

middle.)31

type (not all of which necessarily

Before making

our distinctions

call B-statements

of the first type (those statements

novels themselves

i.e.

"Sherlock

of B-statements

B1

statements.
Other statements
will be numbered
produce
middle,
handed."

sequentially.

a B2-statement
for example:

By appealing

"Hamlet

to logical laws one can

is left-handed

or Hamlet

is not left-

of a disjunctive

statement

which is

to Dr. Fritz Wenisch

of possible

from Bl-statements

that does not violate the law of excluded

This is an example

31 I am indebited
varieties

which can be formulated

B-statements.
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for these insights

fail

let us

found within

Holmes was a detective.")

of

into the

If we could ask Shakespeare

"logically true."
would presumably

this was so he

have to say it was a correct statement.

logical fact that, as Hamlet was portrayed,
left-handed

whether

or not left-handed

It is just a

he must have been either

and so the disjunctive

statement

must

be correct.
We can also come up with B3-statements
to be either correct or incorrect
example,

an author

by appealing

could be describing

Island and how it was snowing.

If, however,

someone

made the

as opposed to the incorrect

any variety of B4-statements

laws as they were known by the author

that:

a scene taking place in Rhode

B3-

"The scene from the novel took place in the summer."

could also produce

determine

For

"The scene from the novel took place during winter" we

would know it to be a correct statement
statement:

to scientific laws.

That it was winter when the scene

took place was never explicitly stated.
B3-statement:

that can be determined

whether

based upon biological

of some fictional work to

they are correct or not.

If, for example,

"Hamlet could die of AIDS" this would be an incorrect

since AIDS was not around

We

at the time of Shakespeare;

we stated
statement

however, if we

stated:

"Hamlet would be hurt if hit with a rock" one would have to

concur

that this was a correct statement.

types of statements
Bl-statements

about fictional objects that can be formulated

are BS-statements

as to whether

But the most interesting

that have an undetermined

that if they and their negations

statement,

the latter would have to be correct.

or incorrect.

nature

they are correct or incorrect . They are those types of

statements

are presented

from

alone it cannot
Two examples

were joined in a disjunctive
When, however, they

be determined

whether

of BS-statements

are:

44

they are correct

"Hamlet is left-

handed"

and "Hamlet is not left-handed."

totally undetermined
right-handed?"

nature.

Shakespeare

Both statements

are of a

If we could ask Shakespeare:
could possibly say:

"Is Hamlet

"Well, the image I

have of Hamlet when I think of him is as being right-handed
I've never really thought

about it until you brought

He could also say, "Well, I don't know Shakespeare
handed

regardless

mind for his character.
incompleteness"

I have never thought

of what Shakespeare

This illustrates

of it."

that fictional

objects

One could be presented
called left-handed.

"ontological

possess.

but it also seems possible

could contain a pair of B 1-statements

may have had in

the peculiar

We have seen a variety of statements

formulated

from Bl-

to me that a particular
having a contradictory

in the first chapter

novel
nature.

with a character

who is

But, by the middle of the novel the character

be called right-handed.
occur.

up the question."3 2

did not write about or portray Hamlet as being right-

or left-handed

statements

although

There are variety of reasons

The first is that it was just an oversight

could

why this could

of the author.

The

second is that it is part of the presentation

of the novel itself and this

too could be occurring

It could be, for example,

for various reasons:

that some other character

was mistaken

also be that the novel portrays

or being deceitful;

some psychological

or stream

it could
of

32 One of course could have actors who portray Hamlet as being right
handed

or left handed

but we are talking about the fictional character

Hamlet as found in the play Hamlet written by Shakespeare

and not

about the actors who portray him as being one way or the other.

45

consciousness
statements

drama in which any number

of contradictory

type B 1-

would be presented.

With the help of Smith we can now show, as was mentioned
the beginning
states

of this section, how the contents

of purely intentional

of affairs can violate the three criteria which autonomous

of affairs cannot violate according
criteria:

Let us restate

the

of the objects that may make up such a state of affairs; i.e. all

physical,
contain

chemical and similar laws must be obeyed; 2) they cannot
mutually

"completely,

exclusive material

unequivocally,

us analyze some examples
do in fact violate Ingarden's

elements;

determined."

3) they must be

To apply Ingarden's

of purely intentional

states

thesis let

of affairs that

criteria set for ontically autonomous

of affairs.

1. "The cow jumped

over the moon."

such that the nature

Here we have a state of affairs

of the objects that make up the state of affairs

violate the physical laws of nature.

2. "The boy picked up the round

square."

Here we have a state of affairs which contains

exclusive

material

elements.

question

even applies to Hamlet because

Hamlet is right-handed
purely intentional
determined."33

Ingarden,

mutually

3. "Hamlet was left-handed."

state of affairs such that we do not know whether

33

states

1) the latter must satisfy all laws that would arise from the

nature

states

to Ingarden.

in

or left-handed.

The Literary Work, 142.
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the state of affairs in

we are never told whether
This example shows us that a

object is not "completely,
We are often presented

Here is a

[and] unequivocally,

with characters

who, while

being portrayed

as being just like really existing people, nevertheless

have what Ingarden
Thus, Ingarden
different

refers to as "spots of indeterminacy."
has discovered

that fictional objects are radically

from either real or ideal ontically autonomous

was just seen, for example,
excluded

middle.

apply to the real object.
the property

As

can be made about every real object such

at least theoretically

whether

or not they

I either have some property A or I do not have

in question.

am not right-handed.

objects.

real objects do not violate the law of

Statements

that it can be determined

34

I am, for example,

either right-handed

or I

But as we saw in applying the same criterion

to a

fictional object such as Hamlet, if we say, "Hamlet is right-handed,"

or,

"Hamlet is not right-handed,"
incorrect.35

neither

assertion

Thus, we have a violation of the law of excluded

is not just a matter of not knowing what property
logically if he is supposed

to be represented

he would be one or the other.
meaning

is correct nor

units

expressed

middle.

It

Hamlet has and that

as a normal human

But rather Hamlet, as projected

by the words and sentences

being
by the

the play consists

of is not defined in either way.
As was previously

mentioned,

Roman Ingarden

holds the position

that what we call fictional objects are in reality purely intentional
objects.

He made a distinction

represented
objects,

34

between those objects as they are

in literary works, which he calls derived purely intentional

and those objects created directly by the original creative

Ibid., 246-252 and 341-342.

35 If both were incorrect
excluded

we would not have a failure of the law of

middle, but the law of non-contradiction.
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processes

of an author

"from concrete

acts of consciousness

by an ego." 36 (Original purely intentional
intentional
meanings

objects owe their existence
and because

to various

The derived purely
word and sentence

of this they "contain a borrowed

"37 They have of course their ultimate

intentionality.
existence

objects).

effected

in the original intentionality

source of

of the acts of consciousness

of

some author .
Ingarden

holds that in comparison

objects purely intentional

with ontically autonomous

objects are an "illusion,"38 an illusion

however that is not based in the ontic sphere of actually
autonomous
existence

objects but rather
and essence

intentional

"an 'illusion' that draws its illusory

from the projecting

a nonentity

object is not

which has no point of contact

in any sphere of existence.

36 Ingarden,

intention .. . of the

act . On the other hand, the purely intentional

a complete nonentity,
support

existing

or

39

11

The Literary Work, 118.

37 Ibid., p. 118 .
38 Dr . Fritz Wenisch holds that the word "illusion " as chosen in this
translation

(unlike its German

equivalent)

point in that it involves thinking

seems questionable

that something

unreal

at this

is thought

of

as real. But when reading a novel we ordinarily don't think about what
we are reading is real. I agree to the extent that it holds before picking
up the novel but that once we do start reading it we need to suspend
reality in order to enjoy the novel and in a sense to step into its world.
39 Ingarden,

The Literary Work, 123 .
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Quasi-Real

Fictional

World and Its Realities

A fictional world and its objects are built up by the meanings
sentences

of various

types, i.e. state of affairs, questions,

commands

etc. and Ingarden

states that "every sentence

according

to its own essence,

a derived purely intentional

correlate."

40

declarative

judgments,
'has,'
sentence

What this means for a state of affairs is that for every

sentence,

there is a purely intentional

which is created by the meaning

content

state of affairs

of the sentence.

But Ingarden

holds that only "Objective states of affairs can directly correspond,
to assertive

of

41

propositions."

in the purely intentional

and further that:

...

"... the objects appearing

state of affairs, or the state of affairs

themselves are characterized according to their mode of existence as, e.g.,
real, ideal, merely possible,
actually
contains

etc., but they are not set [accepted] as

existing in the ontic mode."
sentences

existing realities,
they ultimately
they express

42

In other words a fictional work

which seemingly express
but nevertheless,

intended

truths

about actually

they are not accepted

as positing actually

as nor are

existing realities.

Rather,

realities which are only part and parcel of the world the

work represents.

"... [T]he corresponding

purely intentional

states

affairs or objects are only regarded as really existing, without,
figuratively

40 Ibid.,

speaking,

being saturated

130.

41

Ibid., 129.

42

Ibid., 166.
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with the character

of reality.

of

That is why, despite the transposition
projected

into reality, the intentionally

states of affairs form their own world"43 (i.e. the fictional

world reality as presented
For Ingarden,

by the novel, story or poem).

the following is an example of an action which,

while being regarded as really existing, has only the appearance of really
existing:
If a sentence

is spoken by a represented [fictional] character as a
judgment directed at another represented character, then, if the
first character is truly judging and is sincere, this sentence is
undoubtedly a judgment in the strict sense; but at the same time
it is a judgment that is valid or true only in the domain of the
represented world and in regard to the objects of this world and,
finally, only for the represented characters speaking with each
other. And indeed this is true regardless of whether it is an
individual and particular or a general judgment.44
Ingarden
distinguish

holds that there are various criteria which allow one to

the sentences

those sentences

which express

which only appear

making some sort of judgment
he calls quasi-propositions
be actual

ones. 45 Ingarden

form of assertive
contrast

to express

and quasi-judgments
states:

from

actual propositions

about some state of affairs.

propositions

to genuine

actual propositions

The latter

as they only appear

"... even sentences

which have the

can be modified in such a way that, in

'judgments,'

they make no claims of 'striking'

43 Ibid., 168.
44 Ibid., 172.
45 Ibid., 160.
50

to

an

state of affairs." 46 This applies

objective

to statements

which appear

in a fictional work.
There are several criteria
propositions
reading

from quasi-propositions.

aloud sentences

different

allowing one to distinguish

intonation

were to appear
or subtitles

belonging

than we would give to the same sentences

in a scientific

work.

it is a novel or scientific

regard to the quasi-propositions
the propositions

Another

It is this peculiar

of the work in question
with

contents

in the actually

existing

for this to happen.48
nature

of quasi-propositions

world and live in it as a world peculiarly

having the appearance

to

with the mode of the fully serious,

and quasi-

and the objects they project which "allows us to plunge

the simulated

i.

one is that in the case of the

of their meaning

nor is there the intention

is that the title

treatise.4 7 What is lacking

found in a scientific

there is no anchoring

difference

if they

found in a fictional work as opposed

there is no identification

judgments

when

to a fictional work we give them a

of works inform us of the nature

e. whether

former,

Some of them are:

actual

unreal

into

and yet

of reality. 49
11

46 Ibid., 131.
47 Ibid., 179. Ingarden

proposes

that one could introduce

that one puts before quasi-judgments
judgments
assertion

to distinguish

not unlike what was proposed
sign currently

48 Ingarden,

by Bertrand

used in symbolic logic.

The Literary Work, 171.

49 Ibid., 172.

51

a special sign

them from actual
Russell

and his

Another

peculiarity

of quasi-propositions

and quasi-judgments

and the objects they project, i.e. derived purely intentional
are projected

from the meaning

units of the sentences

fictional works, is for Ingarden:
according

to their content,

objectivities[,
pretend

... are usually

in their content,

of the nature

Ingarden

necessarily

of real time. 50 This is because
11

points out, a "continuous

occurrence

whereas

of any subjective

in its flowing continuity.

this lies precisely in the fact that the represented
projected

by many inter-connected

existence

and essence

meaning

experiences

Needed for Intersubjective

Ibid., 236 .

51

Jbid., 237.

but

The reason

of sentences".

Identity

have either a real or an ideal existence.

51

of Sentences

does not believe that meanings

of words

He does however
units or

An example of an ideal concept would be something

52

for

world [that which is

hold the position that there are such things as ideal meaning

50

of

units] has the source of its

solely in a finite number

As was seen earlier Ingarden

ideal concepts.

world is

real time is, as

a reality which is being represented

which is never representable

or sentences

quasi-real

in fictional worlds, "only isolated 'segments'

'reality' ... are represented,

Ideal Concepts

also brings about

medium" which has no gaps in its

in the real world (regardless

to the contrary),

of real

which allows them only to

the fact that the time belonging to the represented
only an analogue

found in

"Now, objects ... even though,

t]heir ontic heteronomy,

real existence

objects that

that had timelessness
of an absolute

as one of its attributes,

unchangeable

this requirement

nicely.

nature.

Because

could never be perfect because

and would therefore

The idea of a perfect triangle fits

of material

limitations

it is impossible

lines of any triangle to match perfectly.

(Of course practically

The relationship

This shows that it is

this perfect entity in actual physical reality.
between Ingarden's

is similar to the relationship

and the many different particular
different materials

ideal concepts

between

triangles

and word

the perfect triangle

of various sizes and

which are based on this perfect triangle.

we need to make a distinction
concepts.

speaking

for us to have the idea of a perfect entity (e.g. triangle) and yet

we could never produce

meanings

a real triangle

for the intersecting

one could come up with a nearly perfect triangle.)
possible

be

Ingarden

between word meanings

But first

and ideal

tells us that "it is part of the idea of meaning

that

it be bound to some word sound (or to some sign of a visual, acoustic,
or tactile nature)

and hence be its meaning .... Without the 'word

sound' ... [meanings]
meanings

could not exist at all."5 2 Ingarden

are very different from ideal concepts.

use of ideal concepts
concept has a number

in the creation

of sentences,

of word meanings

However, one makes
for "each ideal

for the same object." 53 In just

this way, one can have many different types of individual
yet they are all triangles.

Ingarden

holds that

triangles,

and

tells us that:

A word meaning ... is nothing other than an actualization
of the
meaning contained in the corresponding ideal, ontically
autonomously
existing concepts. Moreover, it is at any one

52 Ibid., 59.
53 Ibid., 87.
53

--

-

- - --

- --

-

-

- ---

----------.-

moment an actualization of only part of this meaning. This
actualization and formation of a unified whole out of component
parts is realized through sentence-forming
operations whereby
they immediately produce word meanings in the form in which
they must appear as component parts of a determinate sentence
or a determinate sentence complex. Through this actualization
something new is undoubtedly produced: the meaning content of
the sentences or the meaning content of a sentence complex.
Ideal concepts are not component parts of these formations.
They are as transcendent
with respect to them as are subjective
operations, and they are also transcendent
with respect to the
latter and remain beyond the reach of their influence. But they
do constitute the antic basis of sentences and the regulative
principle of their formation. In consideration of their ideal
meaning content, the conscious subject selects appropriate
moments in them, brings about their ontically heteronomous
actualization,
and unites them into a new whole.5 4

I will attempt

to explain what Ingarden

means in the above quotation.

The analogy of a perfect triangle and its relationship
individual

triangles

to many different

I think does not fully reveal the nature

and the ideal concepts

of meanings

they rely on. So let us use an example more in

line with what would be found in a literary or fictional work.

Let us use

the ideal concept of "love" and show how one only uses certain aspects
or shades
example,

of its meaning in the writing of a play or a novel.
one uses words and sentences

who express

imperfect

to be a human
lives.

54

to create individual

notions or only certain aspects

The ideal concept of "love" itself has many meanings

54

characters

of what it means

being and how love of some type is expressed

Ibid., 361.

For

in their
imbedded

within it and an author

only pulls certain aspects

out from this concept

to use for the word to describe the specific type of love that he wants
to portray for any one particular
meaning
sounds

that one produces

character.

by the subjective

According to Ingarden

process of binding word

into new complete wholes is a new creation

the author.

These sentences

are created for the purpose
Ideal concepts

each

are new creations

accomplished

especially

by

when they

of building up a fictional world.

are needed for the identity and unity of a literary

work for:
It is only with reference to the meaning content of ideal
concepts that readers of a literary work can reactualize in an
identical manner the meaning content of sentences given to
them by the author. If there were no ideal concepts and,
furthermore,
no ideal qualities (essences) and ideas, not only
would sentences or real and intentional objectivities be
impossible; it would also be equally impossible to achieve
between two conscious subjects genuine linguistic
communication,
in which both sides would apprehend an
identical meaning content of the sentences exchanged . There
frequently are misunderstandings
between two speakers, and,
practically speaking, they frequently cannot apprehend identically
the same sentences. But with the existence of ideal concepts
there is at least in principle the possibility that, by recourse to
the corresponding objectivities and by apprehending
at least part
of the meaning content of the corresponding ideal concepts, each
of the speakers succeeds in forming or constituting a sentence
with a meaning content identical to the other's and hence
understanding
the sentence spoken by the other. 55
Ideal concepts
without

are needed, according

to Ingarden,

them people would not be able to communicate.

55 Ibid., 364.

55

because
When two

people do communicate
because

each one knows what the other is saying

each person has an idea of the ideal concepts

to create the individual
participated

and particular

instances

of participation
ideal concepts

and sentences

used in that communication.

work (or the sentence)

of its existence

heteronomous

in the intentional

and, simultaneously,

heterogeneous

objectivities:

ideal qualities

(essences),

with their

are specifically the meanings
Ingarden

exists as soon as it is created.

an ontically autonomous

formation

that

ideal concept.

of words and sentences

corresponding

subject

of the meanings

with some aspect of their corresponding

These instances

that were used

of the words

tells us:

" ... the

But it exists as

that has the source

acts of the creating

conscious

the basis of its existence

in two entirely

on the one hand, in ideal concepts

and

and, on the other hand ... in real word

signs."56
Ingarden

does believe that there are such things as ideal

concepts

and essences

conscious

individuals

but at the same time if there were no
who participated

in "sentence-forming

operations"57

then we would never have any sentences.

consequences

for our theories

being fictional objects have.
transcend

concerning

and type of

For as we have seen fictional objects

and are different from the meanings

but they are at the same time dependent
existence.

the existence

This has

used to project them

upon meanings

for their

They are in this way different from ideal concepts

type of ideal object in that fictional objects are subject to

56 Ibid., 361.
57 Ibid., 102.
56

or any

transformations
author.

by the subjective

An author

sentence-forming

can for instance

occur to any particular

character

cause profound

operations

of an

transformations

or even to the world or universe

to
that

had been created.

V. CONCLUSION

We have seen that fictional objects are those entities
created

by specifically original acts of consciousness.

which are

They come into

being and exist only by our actions but they have the ability to be
shared

and become part of our lives. In this paper we have seen that

fictional objects are not "nothing,"
existence.
rather

that they do have a type of

They are not purely mind-dependent

entities

that transcend

entities

the mind of any one individual

and yet could not exist if it were not for the peculiar
meanings

either, but

and their use in our lives.

57

nature

person
of
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